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REAL PROPERTY-THE EFFECT OF ZONING ORDINANCES ON THE 
LAW OF NmsANCE-One of the most interesting and least explored 
questions in the law of property is the effect of zoning ordinances 
on the law of nuisance. Particularly interesting is the extent to 
which statutory authorization by zoning can legalize a use of land 
which, in the absence of a zoning ordinance, would constitute a 
nuisance.1 In order to understand this problem fully it is neces-
sary to begin with a general analysis of the law of nuisance and the 
various classifications into which it has been divided by the courts. 
I. The Concept of Nuisance 
A. Generally. The concept of nuisance can safely be said to 
be almost incapable of concrete definition.2 In its widest sense, 
nuisance includes any act or omission which annoys, injures, or 
endangers the comfort, health, safety or repose of others, or in any 
way renders other persons insecure in life or the use of property.8 
For purposes of this comment, however, discussion will be limited 
to interferences with the use and enjoyment of land.4 
Supp. 475, 520. If they do not acquiesce, the Teamsters may induce their employees to 
force them to do so by threat of strike. Chairman Farmer's decision gives considerable 
relief to those employers who have already granted "hot cargo" clauses. They can refuse 
to acquiesce in this secondary action and thus possibly avoid a damage action for violation 
of their common law and statutory duties as common carriers. 
1 An equally interesting and related problem, beyond the scope of this comment, is 
the effect upon the law of nuisance of prohibition of a certain use of land in a given zone. 
See generally in this connection, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143 (1915); 
Grundy Center v. Marion, 231 Iowa 425, 1 N.W. (2d) 677 (1942); Smith v. Collison, 119 
Cal. App. 180, 6 P. (2d) 277 (1931); State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 
172, 121 S. 613 (1929), cert. den. 280 U.S. 556, 50 S.Ct. 16 (1929). See also Noel, "Retro-
active Zoning and Nuisances," 41 CoL. L. REv. 457 (1941); 166 A.L.R. 659 (1947). 
2 "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which 
surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" PROSSER, TORTS 549 (1941). 
8 Summers v. Acme Flour Mills Co., (Okla. 1953) 263 P. (2d) 515. See generally 33 
MARQUEITE L. REv. 240 (1950). Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 
198 P. (2d) 847 (1948), divided nuisances into four categories: (1) harm to human com• 
fort, safety or health because of the defendant's maintaining on his land a dangerous 
instrumentality causing damage to the plaintiff in respect to legally protected interests of 
the plaintiff in his land; (2) illegal or immoral practices; (3) obstruction to streets and 
other public ways; (4) damage to the land itself, as through flooding. Statutes have more 
or less codified the common law meaning of nuisance in many states. These statutes are 
of two general types. One type, common among the southern states, defines a nuisance as 
" ... anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another .... " See Ala. 
Code (1940) tit. 7, §1081; Ga. Code Ann. (1935) tit. 72, §IOI. The other type, more 
common in the western states, defines a nuisance as "anything which is injurious to health, 
or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so 
as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property .... " See Cal. Civ. Code 
(Deering, 1949) §3479; Mont. Rev. Code (1947) §57-101; Minn. Stat. (1953) §561.01. 
4 4 ToRTS REsTATEMENT 216 (1939) points out that the term "nuisance" is used to 
describe both the conduct giving rise to an injury and the injury itself. As this comment 
is restricted to cases where the use made by one person of his land interferes with the 
enjoyment of the land of another, "nuisance" will be used in both of these senses. 
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In determining whether a given use of property constitutes a 
nuisance, a number of different considerations are examined by 
the courts, including such factors as the following: the character 
of the neighborhood,5 the nature of the thing complained of,6 its 
proximity to those alleging damage,7 the frequency and continuity 
of its operation,8 the nature and extent of the injury caused,9 
whether or not there are any means of preventing the damage,10 
whether or not the defendant is conducting its operations in the 
only locality feasible to its success,11 the importance of the defend-
ant's business to the community,12 the amount of the defendant's 
investment,13 and the length of time that the offending business 
has existed.14 It is frequently said that the question in every case 
is whether, considering all the facts and circumstances,15 the de-
fendant is making a "reasonable" use of his premises.16 
Since the effect of zoning on the law of nuisance depends to a 
large extent on the particular type of nuisance involved, it is im-
portant to distinguish between the various classifications of nui-
sance made by the courts. 
B. Public and Private Nuisances. Nuisances are either public 
or private.17 A public nuisance affects all who come within its 
sphere of operation, and thus is often referred to as a "common" 
5 "What would be a substantial interference with enjoyment of life in a residential 
area might very well be perfectly normal and inescapable in an industrial section." 
Jedneak v. Minneapolis General Electric Co., 212 Minn. 226 at 230, 4 N.W. (2d) 326 
(1942). See also Walker v. Wearb, 6 N.Y.S. (2d) 548 (1938); Schott v. Appleton Brewery 
Co., (Mo. App. 1947) 205 S.W. (2d) 917; Gardner v. International Shoe Co., 386 ill. 418, 
54 N.E. (2d) 482 (1944). 
6 Hofstetter v. Myers, Inc., 170 Kan. 564, 228 P. (2d) 522 (1951). 
7 Ibid; Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W. 647 (1940). 
8 Hofstetter v. Myers, Inc., 170 Kan. 564, 228 P. (2d) 522 (1951). 
9 Schott v. Appleton Brewery Co., (Mo. App. 1947) 205 S.W. (2d) 917; 4 TORTS 
llEsTATEMENT §827 (1939). 
10 Godard v. Babson-Dow Mfg. Co., 313 Mass. 280, 47 N.E. (2d) 303 (1943); 4 TORTS 
llEsTATEMENT §828 (c) (1939). 
11 Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 29 N.W. (2d) 1 (1947); Brede v. Minnesota 
Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919); Storey v. Central Hide &: Ren-
dering Co., 148 Tex. 509, 226 S.W. (2d) 615 (1950). 
12 Canfield v. Quayle, 170 Misc., 621, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 781 (1939); Soukoup v. Republic 
Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 66 N.E. (2d) 334 (1946); Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 
Inc., 15 Wash. (2d) 14, 129 P. (2d) 536 (1942). 
13 San Antonio v. Camp Warnecke, (Tex. 1954) 267 S.W. (2d) 468; Strachan v. Beacon 
Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N.E. 787 (1925). 
14 Woschak v. Moffat, 173 Pa. Super. 209, 96 A. (2d) 163 (1953). 
15 The list of factors in the text is not exclusive. For an excellent treatment of the 
various circumstances considered by the courts in deciding whether a nuisance exists, see 
4 TORTS llEsTATEMENT §§826-831 (1939). 
16 Woschak v. Moffat, 173 Pa. Super. 209, 96 A. (2d) 163 (1953); Heppenstall Co. v. 
Berkshire Chemical Co., 130 Conn. 485, 35 A. (2d) 845 (1944). 
17 1 Woon, NUISANCE, 3d ed., §14 (1893); Ga. Code Ann. (1935) tit. 72, §102. 
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nuisance.18 In order to fall within this category, the injury must 
be to the public as such, but the mere fact that a large number of 
people are injured will not necessarily make a nuisance public. 
The crucial factors are the character of the injury and the nature 
of the right affected.19 Abatement in the name of the state is the 
usual remedy for a public nuisance.20 A private individual does 
not have a right of action unless he can show special damage to 
himself of a character different in kind from that suffered by the 
general public.21 
A private nuisance arises from an injury to the use and enjoy-
ment of land22 that is essentially private in character23 and that 
affects a limited number of persons.24 The fact that a business is 
otherwise lawful does not prevent it from being a private nui-
sance.25 It is also possible to have a nuisance that is both public 
and private in character. This is known as a mixed or united 
nuisance.26 
C. Nuisances per se and in Fact. Nuisances may also be di-
vided into nuisances per se and per accidens (in fact). The best 
definition of a nuisance per se would classify it as an act, occupa-
tion ·or structure which is a nuisance in a given area regardless , 
of its manner of operation, a use of land that cannot be so con-
ducted in its· present location as to be allowed to exist.27 A law-
fully authorized business cannot be a nuisance per se.28 
18 39 Ar.r. JUR., Nuisance §8 (1942). There are many types of public nuisance that do 
not involve the use of land. See 1 Woon, NUISANCE, 3d ed., §§17-75 (1893). 
19 Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 353, 32 P. (2d) 425 (1934); JOYCE, NUISANCES §14 
(1906). But see Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922). 
20 Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922). 
21 Ward v. Oakley Co., 125 Cal. App. (2d) 840, 271 P. (2d) 536 (1954); Michelsen v. 
Dwyer, 158 Neb. 427, 63 N.W. (2d) 513 (1954). 
22 Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E. (2d) 682 (1953). In conjunc• 
tion with this limitation it is required that in order to have standing to abate a private 
nuisance a person must have a property right or privilege in the land. Daurizio v. Mer-
chants Despatch Transportation Co., 152 Misc. 716, 274 N.Y.S. 174 (1934); 4 TORTS RE· 
STATEMENT §§822-823 (1939). 
23 Sheinberg v. Churnin, 132 N.Y.S. (2d) 568 (1952); Biber v. O'Brien, 138 Cal. App. 
353, 32 P. (2d) 425 (1934). 
24Adams v. Commissioners of Trappe, 204 Md. 165, 102 A. (2d) 830 (1954); JOYCE, 
NUISANCES §8 (1906). Statutes in some states limit a private nuisance to injuries to " •.• a 
few or determined number of persons." Ga. Code Ann. (1935) tit. 72, §102. 
25 Benjamin v. Lietz, 116 Vtah 476, 211 P. (2d) 449 (1949); Bickley v. Morgan Utilities 
Co., 173 Ark. 1038, 294 S.W. 38 (1927). 
26 1 Woon, NUISANCE, 3d ed., §16 (1893). 
27 See Higgins v. Bloch, 213 Ala. 209, 104 s. 429 (1925); JOYCE, NUISANCES §12 (1906). 
A gas station has been held to be a nuisance per se in a residential neighborhood. Perrin's 
Appeal, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305 (1931). See also Jones v. Trawick, (Fla. 1954) 75 S. (2d) 
785, where the proposed construction of a cemetery in a residential district was enjoined. 
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A nuisance in fact is an act, occupation, or structure which is 
a nuisance only because of its location, surroundings, or manner 
of operation.29 It is no defense that the particuar use of land is 
in connection with an otherwise lawful business.30 The distinc-
tion between a nuisance per se and a nuisance in fact seems only 
a convenient way of saying that a nuisance per se is a nuisance as 
a matter of law, while whether a given use of land constitutes a 
nuisance per accidens depends upon a question of fact.31 Never-
theless, characterizing a given use of land as either a nuisance per 
se or a nuisance in fact has important legal consequences,32 and 
since the courts are prone to express themselves in terms of this 
distinction, it will be adopted here. 
The public-private and the per se-in fact distinctions must not 
be confused. Although there may be a rough correlation between 
public and per se nuisances on the one hand, and private and in 
fact nuisances on the other, they are two separate classifications. 
It is entirely possible to have private nuisances per se and in fact,33 
just as it is to have a public nuisance per se34 and a public nuisance 
in fact.35 
II. The Effect of Zoning on the Law of Nuisance 
A. Nuisances per se and Public Nuisances. At the outset it 
would be well to dismiss briefly the cases that involve the question 
of nuisance per se. In these cases it is unanimously held that 
authorization of a particular use by zoning prevents that use from 
28 Burrows v. Texas &: N.O.R. Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 1090; JOYCE, 
NUISANCES §16 (1906). 
29 Borgenmouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 S. (2d) 488 (1947); 39 
AM. JUR., Nuisance §II (1942). 
30 King v. Columbian Carbon Co., (5th Cir. 1945) 152 F. (2d) 636; British-American 
Oil Producing Co. v. McClain, 191 Okla. 40, 126 P. (2d) 530 (1942). 
31 Borgenmouth Realty Co. v. Gulf Soap Corp., 212 La. 57, 31 S. (2d) 488 (1947). 
32 While the erection and potential operation of a nuisance per se may be enjoined, 
a potential use of land may not be declared a nuisance in fact until it has been given a 
chance to operate. Nesin v. Long Island Granite Co., 205 Misc. 765, 130 N.Y.S. (2d) 187 
(1954); Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 850, 43 N.W. (2d) 726 (1950). Furthermore, 
if a use of land is found to be a nuisance per se, it will be completely enjoined, whereas 
if it is merely a nuisance in fact it will be enjoined only to the extent that its methods 
of operation are unlawfully injurious. Morton v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. (2d) 576, 
269 P. (2d) 81 (1954); State v. Stubblefield, 36 Wash. (2d) 664, 220 P. (2d) 305 (1950). 
33 Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 238 N.C. 185, 77 S.E. (2d) 682 (1953). 
34 New Orleans v. Lafon, (La. App. 1952) 61 S. (2d) 270. 
35 Fort Smith v. Western Hide &: Fur Co., 153 Ark. 99, 239 S.W. 724 (1922). See 
generally JOYCE, NUISANCES §15 (1906). 
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constituting a nuisance per se.36 Statutes in a number of states 
make this clear by providing that "nothing which is done or main-
tained under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a 
nuisance."37 The rule preventing a nuisance per se from existing 
under zoning authority would seem to apply whether the nuisance 
be private or public in nature. 
What effect a zoning ordinance has on public nuisances is a 
little less clear, but generally where a business is conducted in its 
proper zone, it cannot be a public nuisance.38 When it is consid-
ered that a public nuisance traditionally has been thought of as 
an offense against the state,30 in some cases a crime,40 it is difficult 
to quarrel with this conclusion.41 
B. Private Nuisance. In the field of private nuisance, the vast 
weight of authority is to the effect that zoning laws do not author-
ize a private nuisance. The fact that a business is operated in its 
proper zone is no defense to an action for a private nuisance in 
fact.42 This seems to be based on the generally accepted doctrine 
that it is no defense to an action for abatement of a private nui-
sance that the business causing the injury is an otherwise lawful 
business, 43 or that the methods used are necessary for its successful 
36 Kay v. Pearliris Realty Corp., 106 N.Y.S. (2d) 443 (1951). Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 
185 Okla. 20, 97 P. (2d) 574 (1939); Salvation Army v. Frankenstein, 22 Ohio App. 159, 
153 N.E. 277 (1926). 
37 Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) §3482; Idaho Code (1948) §52-108; Wash. Rev. Code 
(1953) 7.48.160. As to the effect of these statutes on other types of nuisances, see notes 41 
and 43 infra. 
38 Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, ll5 Colo. 106, 169 P. (2d) 171 (1946); Shields v. 
Spokane School District No. 81, 31 Wash. (2d) 247, 196 P. (2d) 352 (1948). State v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga County, (Ohio Com. PI. 1947) 79 N.E. (2d) 698, 
affd. 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E. (2d) 9ll (1948). Contra, Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 
P. (2d) 678 (1933). 
30 39 AM. JUR., Nuisance §8 (1939). 
40 CLARK AND MARSHALL, Qm.rns, 5th ed., §462 (1952). 
41 The statutes cited in note 37 supra would seem to apply to public nuisances. But 
see Eaton v. Klimm, 217 Cal. 362, 18 P. (2d) 678 (1933); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (1950) §73Ia. 
42 Bruskland v. Oak Theatre, 42 Wash. (2d) 346, 254 P. (2d) 1035 (1953); Williams v. 
Blue Bird Laundry Co., 85 Cal. App. 388, 259 P. 484 (1927). Scallet v. Stock, 363 Mo. 721, 
253 S.W. (2d) 143 (1952); Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 
(1933); Soukoup v. Republic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 66 N.E. (2d) 339 (1946); Ellis 
v. Blanchard, (La. App. 1950) 45 S. (2d) 100. 
43 See note 25 supra. It is clear that the statutes referred to in note 37 supra, and 
general statements such as that of the New York court in Matter of Goelet v. Moss, 248 App. 
Div. 499 at 500, 290 N.Y.S. 573 (1936), affd. 273 N.Y. 503, 6 N.E. (2d) 425 (1937), to the 
effect that " ••• the Zoning Law is the controlling authority as to what uses the owners 
may make of their property in a given district .•• " do not generally apply to private 
nuisances in fact. See Fendley v. City of Anaheim, IIO Cal. App. 731, 294 P. 769 (1930). 
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operation.44 Some courts go so far as to say that a municipality 
cannot legalize a private nuisance,45 occasionally placing this on 
the constitutional prohibition against taking private property 
without compensation.46 Indeed, some zoning ordinances, while 
setting aside a given area for industrial use, specifically prohibit 
offensive or obnoxious methods of operation.47 
While most courts will not allow a zoning ordinance to sanc-
tion a private nuisance, as a bare minimum it is agreed that the 
ordinance must be considered in deciding whether or not there 
is a nuisance.48 The zoning law is treated as an expression of the 
will of the municipality, and must be considered as a factor in 
favor of the use made of the land.49 Excluding evidence of the 
zoning laws in a case involving private nuisance has been held to 
be reversible error.50 
In three leading cases, courts have given still greater effect to 
zoning ordinances than is prescribed by the general rule. In Bove 
v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp.01 the New York court refused to 
enjoin the operation of an around-the-clock coke oven located in 
an industrial zone despite the fact that its operation caused sub-
stantial injury to a private landowner in the immediate neighbor-
hood. In ]edneak v. Minnesota General Electric Co.52 the Minne-
sota court allowed a power plant to operate in an industrial zone 
despite the fact that injury to neighboring landowners was caused 
44 Malm v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E. (2d) 900 (1949); Brede v. Minnesota Crushed 
Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919). 
45 Benton v. Kernan, 127 N.J. Eq. 434, 13 A. (2d) 825 (1940), mod. 130 N.J. Eq. 193, 
21 A. (2d) 755 (1941). 
46 State v. Board of County Commissioners of Cuyahoga County, (Ohio Com. Pl. 
1947) 79 N.E. (2d) 698, affd. 149 Ohio St. 583, 79 N.E. (2d) 911 _(1948). While generally 
this is limited to a taking of private property for public use, the Oklahoma Constitution 
includes a prohibition against taking private property for a private use with or without 
compensation. OKLA. CONST. (1907) art. 2, §23. See Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 
20, 97 P. (2d) 574 (1939); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Vandergriff, 190 Okla. 280, 122 P. (2d) 
1020 (1942). 
47 See Kosich v. Poultrymen's Service Corp., 136 N.J. Eq. 571, 43 A. (2d) 15 (1945); 
Beane v. H. K. Porter, Inc., 280 Mass. 538, 182 N.E. 823 (1932). Under this type of 
ordinance, the fact that the business is carefully operated is irrelevant. 
48 Rockenbach v. Apostle, 330 Mich. 338, 47 N.W. (2d) 636 (1951); Weltshe v. Graf, 
323 Mass. 498, 82 N.E. (2d) 795 (1948); White v. Old York Road Country Club, 322 Pa. 
147, 185 A. 316 (1936). 
49 Perrin's Appeal, 305 Pa. 42, 156 A. 305 (1931). Dawson v. Laufersweiler, 241 Iowa 
650, 43 N.W. (2d) 226 (1950). 
50 Walker v. Delaware Trust Co., 314 Pa. 257, 171 A. 458 (1934). But see Ellis v. 
Blanchard, (La. App. 1950) 45 S. (2d) 100. 
51236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). 
52212 Minn. 226, 4 N.W. (2d) 326 (1942). 
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by its operation. And in Patterson v. Peabody Coal Co.,53 since 
the defendant's coal washer and drier was operated in an area 
zoned for industry, the Illinois court refused to enjoin the opera-
tion although it admittedly caused injury to the plaintiff.54 In 
these· cases the courts emphasized the importance of industry to 
society and the fact that the business involved was being conducted 
in a zone set apart for it by the municipality. Stressing the fact 
that industry could not survive if every substantial invasion of 
private interests was grounds for an injunction, they refused to 
prevent the operation of the vario.us industries involved unless, as 
was said in the Patterson case, the interference with the use of land 
was substantial and unreasonable, or unless the defendant was not 
op·erating the business as carefully as possible.55 
Much the same result, in even stronger language, is achieved 
in California by means of a statute enacted in 1935. This statute 
reads: 
"Whenever any city, city and county, or county shall have 
established zones or districts under authority-of- law wherein 
certain manufacturing or commercial uses are expressly per-
mitted, except in an action to abate a public nuisance brought 
in the name of the people of the State of California,56 no per-
son or persons, :firm or corporation shall be enjoined or re-
strained by the injunctive process from the reasonable and 
necessary operation in any such industrial or commercial zone 
of any use expressly permitted therein, nor shall such use be 
deemed a nuisance without evidence of the employment of 
unnecessary and injurious methods of operation .... "57 
The major significance of this legislation is that it prevents a com-
mercial use from constituting a private nuisance whenever it is 
conducted in its proper zone without unnecessary and injurious 
methods of operation.58 The fact di.at damage may be caused by 
53 3 Ill. App. (2d) 311, 122 N.E. (2d) 48 (1954). 
54 Beside the Bove, Jedneak, and Patterson cases, there is very little authority to the 
effect that a business conducted in its proper zone is not a private nuisance in fact where 
such business would have been a nuisance in the absence of the zoning ordinance. Such 
a position was taken, however, in Linsler v. Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 206 P. 
976 (1922). See also Kirk v. Mabis, 215 Iowa 769, 246 N.W. 759 (1933). 
55 The latter exception was also recognized by the Minnesota court in the Jedneak case. 
56 Note that this is a direct opposite of the usual result; zoning legalizes a private 
nuisance, but not a public nuisance. 
57 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1950) §73Ia. 
58 By the technical wording of the statute, a distinction is drawn between the standard 
of operation required for a business to avoid being a nuisance, and to avoid being enjoined. 
Injurious methods of operation are all that are required in order to deem a commercial 
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this operation is irrelevant.59 It has been seen that although there 
is some authority at common law for the position taken by this 
statute, 60 the general common law rule holds that the fact that a 
business is operated as carefully as possible does not prevent its 
injunction as a nuisance if sufficient interference with the use and 
enjoyment of land can be shown.61 Thus, whereas the three prin-
cipal factors at common law are the extent of the injury, the local-
ity of the business, and its manner of operation, once the locality 
is established as a commercial zone the California legislation looks 
only to the manner of operation of the business. 
There does not seem to have been any claim that this statute 
is unconstitutional, despite the fact that it denies to landowners 
a right to abate a nuisance which existed before its enactment. 
There should be little doubt that section 731a is constitutional, 
however.62 In order to come within the statute, the land must be 
used for a "manufacturing or commercial" use, 63 but the actual 
business carried on need not be mentioned in the zoning ordinance 
use a nuisance, but in order to enjoin that operation unreasonable methods must be 
shown. It would seem that there could be injurious methods of operation which are not 
unreasonable, and thus the statute may prevent the enjoining of certain uses even though 
they may be a nuisance. 
rm See 9 So. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1936). 
60 It has been held that the legalization of a use of land by a zoning ordinance 
prevents that use from being enjoined, but does not preclude an injured individual from· 
suing for damages. Fairfax Oil Co. v. Bolinger, 186 Okla. 20, 97 P. (2d) 574 (1939). See 
also Robinson Brick Co. v. Luthi, 115 Colo. 106, 169 P. (2d) 171 (1946). This may be 
true in any case when there is only a minor inconvenience to individual rights and the 
policy in favor of allowing the business to continue is strong. Oliver v. Forney Cotton 
Oil and Ginning Co., (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) 226 S.W. 1094; Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 
Mich. 448 (1871). 
61 Malm v. Dubrey, 325 Mass. 63, 88 N.E. (2d) 900 (1949); Durfey v. Thalheimer, 85 
Ark. 544, 109 S.W. 519 (1908). Marshall v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 177 N.E. 504 (1931). 
Section 731a clearly changed the common law rule in California. See Gelfand v. O'Haver, 
33 Cal. (2d) 218, 200 P. (2d) 790 (1948); 9 So. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1936). 
62 In Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 (1884), the state had passed an act which 
legalized the ringing of bells by factories to give notice to their employees, and authorized 
the various municipalities to set the sizes and weights for their particular area. A city 
ordinance, passed under authority of this statute, which allowed bells to be rung at 5:00 
A.M. was sustained, despite the fact that bell ringing earlier than 6:30 A.M. had pre-
viously been held to be a private nuisance. See also Dudding v. Automatic Gas Co., 145 
Tex. I, 193 S.W. (2d) 517 (1946). Warren Co. v. Dickson, 185 Ga. 481) 195 S.E. 568 
(1938). However, if the legislature authorizes merely the business, and not the particular 
methods used, obnoxious methods of operation may be held to constitute a private nui-
sance. 25 TEX. L. R.Ev. 96 (1946). Query if §73la would be held constitutional in Okla-
homa, however. See note 46 supra. 
63 This is interpreted broadly. See North Side Property Owners' Assn. v. Hillside 
Memorial Park, 70 Cal. App. (2d) 609, 161 P. (2d) 618 (1945), where a cemetery was held 
to be within §731a. 
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in order to be "expressly permitted."64 It should also be noted that 
this statute provides a defense to nuisance actions only. A land-
owner may still recover damages65 if a case in trespass can be 
established. 66 
When a business is located in its proper zone, and is operated 
in the best possible manner, there is much to be said for the result 
achieved by the California legislation. The typical zoning ordi-
nance is hostile to industrial uses; a number of zones are created, 
successively less restricted, with industrial uses allowed in only the 
least restricted zone. 67 The more favored uses of land are allowed 
in all less restricted zones, so that while Zone One prohibits in-
dustry and allows only private residences, Zone Five allows indus-
try but does not correspondingly exclude residential uses.68 Thus 
a private residence may be located in an industrial zone, sur-
rounded by factories, coke ovens, drop forges, etc., all of which 
necessarily emit smoke, noise, odors and other annoyances. Ad-
mittedly, the mere fact of injury to the private landowner alone 
would not necessarily predicate an injunction of these industries 
when the character of the neighborhood, importance of the busi-
ness to the community, etc., are considered. Nevertheless, it seems 
appropriate to consider whether the fact that an area is zoned for 
industry should not have sufficient additional weight to preclude 
a business from ever constituting a nuisance when operated as 
carefully as possible within that area. 
It has been seen that under the typical zoning ordinance, there 
is only a limited area in which industry may lawfully operate, 
whereas less offensive uses are free to locate themselves in many 
other, less restricted, zones. When an industry or business is con-
64 McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. (2d) 315, 154 P. (2d) 428 (1944). For an 
interesting comparison with Massachusetts law, see note 74 infra. 
65 But not an injunction, unless unreasonable methods of operation can be shown. 
See note 58 supra. 
66 McNeill v. Redington, 67 Cal. App. (2d) 315, 154 P. (2d) 428 (1944). The basic 
distinction between nuisance and trespass is that the former is an interference with the 
use and enjoyment of the land, while the latter is an interference with the exclusive 
possession of land. PROSSER, TORTS 578 (1941). The same conduct may often constitute 
both a nuisance and a trespass. 
67 For a detailed analysis of the content of the typical zoning ordinance, see BAKER, 
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 60 et seq. (1927). 
68 It should be noted that not all zoning ordinances are so framed. See BAKER, T~ 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF ZONING 66 (1927); WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 
277 (1922). An ordinance excluding residential building from an industrial zone was held 
to be unconstitutional by the Connecticut court in a decision specifically limited to the 
particular circumstances involved. Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 
A. (2d) 112 (1953). 
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ducting its operations in a reasonable manner so as not to cause 
unreasonable or unnecessary harm to others, it would seem that it 
is a proper function of zoning to assure that this business can· 
operate free from nuisance actions brought by other users of land 
who are at liberty to locate themselves in other areas. The Cali-
fornia legislation is significant in that it acknowledges this prin-
ciple. It recognizes that zoning has a greater function than merely 
that of excluding use A from Zone One in order to protect the 
individuals in that zone. It clearly recognizes that zoning has the 
further function of affirmatively providing use A an area in Zone 
Five in which to operate in a reasonable manner, free of the limi-
tations placed upon it by private nuisance rights of neighboring 
landowners. It was never doubted that the power of zoning to 
eliminate certain land uses from certain areas is not limited to the 
exclusion of those uses that constitute a common law nuisance, 69 
and it has been said that one of the major reasons for the growth 
of zoning has been the inadequacy of nuisance law to handle the 
problem.70 On the other hand, it is well settled that the legislature 
may legalize that which, in the absence of such authorization, 
would be a nuisance.71 It should be a proper function of zoning 
to serve as specific statutory authorization for business and industry 
to operate reasonably and carefully within a limited area. One of 
the important purposes of zoning is to assure the maximum eco-
nomic use of all land in a municipality.72 This purpose is frus-
trated if private nuisance actions can deny to industry a place in 
the community in which to operate in a reasonable manner.73 
-09 Jones v. Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930); Beverly Oil Co. v. Los Angeles, 
40 Cal. (2d) 552, 254 P. (2d) 865 (1953); Noel, "Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances," 41 
CoL. L. R.Ev. 457 (1941). 
70 Bettman, "Constitutionality of Zoning," 37 HARV. L. R.Ev. 834 (1924). 
71 "It is settled that, within constitutional limits not exactly determined, the Legis-
lature may change the common law as to nuisances, and may move the line either way, so 
as to make things nuisances which were not so, or to make things lawful which were 
nuisances, although by so doing it affects the use of value of property." Holmes, J., in 
Commonwealth v. Parks, 155 Mass. 531 at 532, 30 N.E. 174 (1892). See also Murtha v. 
Lovewell, 166 Mass. 391, 44 N.E. 347 (1896); Elder v. City of Winder, 201 Ga. 511, 40 
S.E. (2d) 659 (1946); Collegeville Borough v. Philadelphia Suburban Water Co., 377 Pa. 
636, 105 A. (2d) 722 (1954) (public nuisance). See also note 62 supra. 
72 Landels, "Zoning: An Analysis of Its Purposes and Its Legal Sanctions," 17 A.B.A.J. 
163 (1931). 
73 This point is made with great conviction in Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 
236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932). The court concluded (at p. 43) by saying: "It 
is not for the court to . • . condemn as a nuisance a business which is being conducted 
in an approved and expert manner, at the very spot where the council said that it might 
be located." 
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Although it may be questioned whether most zoning ordi-
nances have this specific intent,74 a clearly drawn ordinance, sup-
plemented if necessary by legislation similar to the California 
statute, would in all likelihood be upheld as a valid exercise of 
the police power.75 Even in the absence of legislation there are 
strong reasons why courts should adopt a position similar to that 
taken by the Bove, Patterson and J edneak cases, and deny individual 
landowners the right to abate as a nuisance businesses carried on 
in their proper zone. If an industry is conducted unreasonably 
so as to cause substantial injury to others, the unreasonable meth-
ods should be enjoined regardless of zoning laws. But where the 
industry is properly conducted in an industrial zone, the courts 
should give effect to zoning ordinances as a limitation on nuisance 
actions to enjoin the operation.76 
Robert B. Fiske, Jr., S.Ed. 
74 There is some basis for concluding that the Massachusetts courts draw a distinction 
between an ordinance that expressly permits certain uses of land to be made in a certain 
zone, and an ordinance that merely prohibits certain uses from being made, implying 
negatively that unmentioned uses are allowed. See Marshall v. Holbrook, 276 Mass. 341, 
177 N.E. 584 (1931); Beane v. H. K. Porter, Inc., 280 Mass. 538, 182 N.E. 823 (1932). 
Zoning ordinances are not treated as legislative licenses to maintain a private nuisance 
in Massachusetts, but the courts that make statements to this effect invariably rely on the 
Marshall and Porter cases, where the zoning ordinance was of the negative type. See 
Tortorella v. H. Traiser & Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933); Weltshe v. Graf, 323 
Mass. 498, 82 N.E. (2d) 795 (1948). It is unfortunate that the opinions in the last two 
cases do not make clear which type of ordinance was involved. 
75 See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114 (1926); Linsler v. 
Booth Undertaking Co., 120 Wash. 177, 200 P. 976 (1922). 
76 It is conceivable that in some instances the injury caused by even the most careful 
methods of operation might be sufficient to justify an action for damages by the individual 
aggrieved. In this connection see notes 58 and 60 supra. 
